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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
STELLA FELICE GIGLIOTTI,

Plaintiff and Appellarn;t:

vs.
LEOPOLDO ALBERGO,

Defenda(fl)t and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
This action sh'ould be -considered, at least in part,
with the c.ase of Albergo vs. Gigliotti, et al., decided by
this ~Court on Decem·ber 12, 19'38, ...... Utah ...... , 85 P. (2d)
107. This ease was one involving the foreclosure of a
pul'lported mortgag,e .on the property in favor of Albergo and in which foreclosure proceeding, he neglected
to make ·Stella F'elice Gigliotti, the present appellant,
one of the parties defendant. It is claimed that appellant wa~s in possession of the real property at the time
of the forecl~osure suit and the wife of Ross Gigliotti,
who wa.s made a pa.rty to the Albergo suit. It is also
claimed that app.ellant was the owner of the property
by reason of the unrecorded deed. In the main, this
Court is ·called upon to determine the rights of a wife
of .a party defendant to a fore-closure suit omitted thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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from as a party defendant and regardle•ss ·of, her deed,
had an inchoate interest in ·the property sought to be
foreclosed. ·
BTATE~ENT

O·F. CA1S·E.

It Inight he ·eonvenient to briefly' review t·he undisputed facts as shown from t:he testimony adduced and
from ·the v.ari'ous exhibits in the ·case. We summarize
the ·salient point·s as follorws:

'1. ·O·n August 22, 19'27 F'elice W. and Maria Gigliotti (not the plaintiff), husband and wife, mortgaged
the property tq the res-pondent, A]bergo. The mortgage
was filed for re.cord and recorded in the office of the
County R.ecorder of C:arhon County on August 28, 1927.
('Exhibit "A").
N·ote: Exhibit ''A'' referred to throughout this brief
consists of the file involving the foreelosure action enti tied in this court as Case No. 4563, wherein Leopoldo
Albergo, the present defendant, was plaintiff and F'elice
W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti, husband and wife, and
Rqsario Gigliotti, Ross Gigliotti, Shell ·Oil C·omp.any, a
corporation, and W. H. Bintz Company, a corporation,
were defendants and in which case a .decree
of· fore'
.

'

closure was entered in .fa.vor of Alhergo and against the
'

I

'

•

•

•

'

named defendants and whi·ch decree was affirmed with
some modifi-cation by this Court on December 12,' 1938

(Albergo

v.

Gigliotti, et al., 85 Pa.c. (2d) 107). This de-

cision holds that R6·sario or Ro·ss Gigliotti, one and the
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same person, had an interest in the property by reason
of an existing contract of purchase th~reto and.which interest a.nd -contra~t prevented hin1 from .setting up aQ.Yersely to the interest of the mortgagee a tax deed acquired from ·Carbon County.
2. On Aug11st. 31, 1931, Felice W. 1 G~gliotti and
Maria Gigliotti, husband and "\vife, as vendors entered
into a c.ontraet ·of sale with Rosario or R9ss Gigliotti as
purchaser whereby the vendors .agreed t.o ·.sell and ~~e
purchaser. agreed .to buy for the eonsideration therein
named the property involved in this :controversy and
which ·COntract WaS recorded in the year 19'31 irtthe· office of the County Recorder of Carbon County in Book
30, page 270. (E·xhibit ''A'')
.

3.

.

.

~The appellant in this action, IS:tella F·elice .Gig~

liotti, wa·s. married to the Rosario or Ro:ss Gigliotti mentioned ·above ·On June 1, 1929 at

D~vis

County, .State of

( 1Exh~bit

"B'') and immediately thereafter moyed
into the property in 9uestion where she lived with her
husband ·continuously up to the p-resent time.. (·Tr .. pp.
26-27; Ahs. p. 27)
Utah

4. The mortgage foreclosure action wa.s commeneed
.on. July 18, 19-36. A lis,. pH~dens was . recorded in the ~f
:fi~ce of the \County Recorder on the same day. (Exhibit

"A:'')
5.

The appellant in the present action, the wife

of Rosario or Ros·s Gigliotti, since .June 1, 19·29 has been
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r'esiding on the property and was not mHde a. party defendant to the foreclosure suit. (Exhibit ''A'')
6. On July 17, 19·3'6, the day before the commencement .of the forHclosure suit, there 'vas made, ,exe,cuted
and delivered to the appellant a quit claim deed to the
property from Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria. Gigliotti and
Rosario or Ross Gigliotti as grantors. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, p. 5-3)
7. 'The note secured by the mortgage subsequently
foreclosed and given by appellant's father-in-law and
mother-in-la,v, Felice W. and Maria Gigliotti, to t4e respondent, Albergo, wa·s dated August 22, 19'27, and due
five years after the date or August 22, 1932. (Exhibit

''A'')
8. ·The pres-ent action was commenced by the filing
of a complaint on the 1st day of September, 19H9 or more
than six years .after the note se,cured by the mortgage in
favor of Albergo became due and more than six year·s
after the last payment of either princi'J)al or interest
thereon. As against the .appellant the note and mortgage is harred ;by the statute of limitations.
9. ·The respondent, Albergo, has known the appellant, Stella Felice Gigliotti, ''since about the tin1e
she has been married'' to Rosario or Ros·s Gigliotti.
(Tr. pp. 49-9!5; Abs. p. 64)
· Note: As stated above, the evidence shows that the
appelhtnt was married to Ross Gigliotti on June 1, 1929
ani! immediately thereafter moved into poss·es·sion of the
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property involved 'Yith her husband where she has .re;mained eYer since.
10. ·The appellant is the mother of t'vo minor children and the "head of the family'' as contemplated by
the homestead law of this

state~

!This action is one to quiet title and the

c.om,plain~

(Tr. p. 1; .A:bs. pp. 1-4) is in the ordinary form for su-ch
action and in the main prays that appellant's interest
in the property be determined by a. deeree of

~Co:urt.

By answer and counter-claim (Tr. p. 4; Abs. pp. 4-10)
the respondent sets up that he is the ·owner of the property 'by reason of the foreclosure ·proceedings above referred to and the subsequent ·sale of the property to ·him
by reas.on thereof and by reason of the fact that the
plaintiff, vvhile not made a party to the foreclosure suit,
allegedly sat idly iby from the time of the commencement
of that action until the filing of the present suit without
asserting her rights and by reason thereof is estopped
from claiming any interest in the property. By way of
reply (Tr. p. 20; Ahs. pp. 21-2:5) ap·pellant pleaded
the fact that ·she was not made a party to the foreclosure
suit; that she had an interest in the property as the

wi~e

of Ross Gigliotti; that she cl"aimed a homestead exemption and- tha~ Albergo's pre~sent claim, if any, by reason
of the note and . mortgage in his favor was ba.rred by
the statute of limitations.
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s:T·ATE M·E'N'T O·F E.R.RO,RJS RE,LIED
1

UP\ON~

1. ·The .first assignment .of error challenges the suf:Qyiency of respondent's .answer and counterclaim as a
pr·ope;r 'pleading. The gist of appellant's action is that
her equity of redemption was not cut off by the foreclosure suit .and- the answer and counterclaim of the respondent admits that appellant was not made a party
defendant to the foreclosure ·suit and does not affirmatively state any fact that would estop her fr;om now ass·erting her right or interest to the property involved.
2. Assignmeints of errors 5 to 16, both inclusive, and
assignments 18, 20, 21, inclusive, and assignments 23 to
·27, both inclusive all pertain to the theory or subjec!t
m&tter as stated ahove in paragraph 1. Assignm.ents
2, ,3, and 4 are directed to the propriety of rulings of the
CouJ"t on the introduction of evidence and particularly
to the Court's exclusion of testim·ony which might have
dev.el.o:ped the fact that Albergo in fact knew that appellant was in -possession of the real property and was
the wife of Ross Gigliotti before the commencement of
his forecl0:sure proceedings .
. 3... .Assignments 17, 19, 22 and 28 are all directed to
specific portions ·of the Findings of F'act that are ·claimed
not to be supported by, but are contrary to the evidenee,
and vvithout such fi·ndings Albergo would not be entitled
to prevail either on his answer or counterclaim.
4~

Assignment .o:f ·error 37, in .addition to what
has ,been heretofore .stated, points out that appellant is
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not only the record O\Yner of the property involved, but
that she ba's an interest therein by reason of her marital
status and her claim of hon1estead exemption; that she
did not practic.e any fraud or deceit or c:ollusion; and tlhat
any claim that respondent might have by way of his
alleged mortgage is barred by the statute of limitations.
Furthermore, and by assignment of error 37, it is pointed out that the c·ourt failed to determine or otherwise
fix or define the equity or right of redemption that a.ppellant might have in the real property involv-ed herein.

QUE.S'TLON·S INVO,LV·ED.
1. It being eonceded that a married man ha,s an interest in real property inferior to the rights of a. mortgagee, what effect does a foreclosure have upon the
rights of the wife in p·ossession of the property at the
time .o.f the foreclosur·e~
·2. Does .a wife have the right to aBsert and have
determined in her behalf a home.stead exemption without
her interest in real property having been previously
terminated by contract or foreclosure~
3. Is not Albergo, the respondent, hound by the
evidence produced by him on cross examination of appellant to the effect that prior to the foreclosure suit
she was occupying the property under elaim of title~
4. In an action to quiet title, should not all interests
be determined, even though such interests might be less
than that of a. fee simple title bolder~
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5. Whether or not the -appellant 1s .estopped . a.s
claimed by the respondent from asserting any interest
in the property in question.

ARGUMENT.
The ultimate question to be determined in the case
a.t lbar is the interest, if any, of the appellant in and to
the real property des-cribed in her complaint on file
herein.

The complaint is in the ordinary form pertain-

ing to actions to quiet title to real property as c.ontemplated by Title 104, ~Chapter 57, Revised Statutes of Utah,

1933. This· chapter enlarges the an-cient· jurisdiction .of
courts of equity with respect to suits to quiet title and
to determine adverse claim1s. The first section reads :
\-.

''An action. may be brought by any person
against another who ·claims· an estate or interest
in real property a.dvers.e to him for the pu.rpose
of deterrninring suoh adverse claim-.". (Italies ours)
.i'

18.
.

'

Any in teres.t in proper.ty apd even possession alone
sufficient to -lnaintain the Etction.
.

.

.

See

wey

v. Salt

Lake City, 35 Utah 504, 101 Pac. 381; ·Colu.mbia Trust Co.
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v. Nielsolfl., 76 Utah 129, 287 Pae. 92~6; and Robins v.
Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 Pac. (2d) 340.
The respondent in this action \Vas the purchaser at
a sheriff sale on foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
of the property involved. It makes no difference in this
action that the purchaser \va.s the original mortgagee in
the foreclosure proceedings, those proceedings having
been introduced in evidence as appellant's Exhibit "A'',
and in which action the appellant was omitted as a. party
defendant. It is a fundamental principle of la.w and
one that does not need citation of authorities to the effect
that a purchaser at a sheriff's sale on foreclosure is not
an innocent purchaser for value, but ta:kes title subject
to all apparent rights of parties in poss·ession and the
rights of others not made parties to the foreclosure suit
who have :of record a~n equity of redemption. In using
the term ''·of record,'' we mean actual notice· of a claimant subs-equent to the original J?-Ortgagor and also constructive notice of a claim sueh as i:s imparted under our
law by recording or actual p:arssession under claim of
title, either subsequent or prior to the execution of the
mortgage.
The general rule with respect to the lack of necessity
of intervention i·s stated in 19 R. C. L. 557,

S·e~ction

363,

in the following language:
''And a wife is not _estopp·ed by her mere
silence from afterwards asserting her rights,
where lan·d in fact .belonging to her, but supposed
to lbelong to her bus band, is sold under deeree
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of foreclosure, the wife not having been served
in the suit; nor is she to· be rega·rded as having
ratified the •proceedings by the acceptance of a
part. of the purchase money· of the sale, but in
such ease must be·taken to have acted as the agent
-of and subject to the control of her huS'band. ''
·The ·ease cited by the text is that of Fahie v. Pressey,
2 Ore. 23, 80 Am. D·ec. 401. In this ·case the holder of the
mortgage obtained his decree of foreclosure against the
husband only and then after the sale discovered that the
title to the property was in the name o~ the wife, who
thereafter set up a claim t:o. the property. The complainant --. bought the -premises at the sale and then filed a bill
in equity to foreclose the wife's interest in the property
alleging that her interest was merely nominal; that she
had full knowledge of all the proceedings and the fact
that the property was advertised ·as that of her husband; that she suffered it to be sold as such and with
full kno-wledge that the property had been so sold rec-eived a part of the proGeeds of the sale and ratified the
sa1ne. In this case the com'Plainant, Fahie, was in the
same position tha_t the defendant, Albergo, is in in the
case at :_\·bar. The •eomplainant took the position that
equity. should relieve him of the ·consequences of h!s
;~,

n1istake in not making the wife a party to the foreclosure
suit. To this a~gument the court said:
· ·-:

''A large proportion of the misfortunes . of
life are: not· so much attrilbutable to the superior
.:; 1;·~j~(t.: saga,citi or overreaching unscrupulousness of one
~ s->-n ·.class a!s to the blind folly a.nd riegligen,ce of anoth.- .<.J ·; ,_ er...'Litigation 'vould never end were courts to
..-;\~U

i·i.
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undertake to restore the equilibrium of right betvYeen all such parties. ·To entitle a party to relief in such cases, the facts must not only be material, but must be such that he could not with
reasonable diligence haYe obtained knowledge of
them. ''"'"here there is neither accident nor mistnke, fraud nor 1nisrepresentation, equity affords
no relief to a party on the ground that he has lost
his remedy at la \Y through In ere ignorance of a
fact, the knovvledge of \Yhic.h might have, been obtained by due diligence and inquiry : Willard's
Eq. Jur. 70.''
As to the contention that Mrs. Pressey was estopped,
the court cited the Tenn. case of Crenshaw v . .Anthony,
Mart. & Y. 110, and the case of Ba.nk of United Sta.tes v.
Lee, 13 Pet. 107, and the court said:
l.

''In both of these ~cases, the obliga,tion of the
\Yife to dis,close her interest in the property being
dealt \vith by the husband as his own, came directly under revie-w· and in both her silenee was a pIJlroved on the express ground of her marital relation ; and that she had done no affirmative act
to mislead or draw in a creditor to trust her husiband. But it is said that Penna P'ressey, having
notice of all these proceedings, by receiving a
part of the proceeds of the sale, ratified it, and
it vvould be a fraud on her p!art no\v to gainsay
it. It might be ans,vered to this-.if it were in
. connection with other than a legal proceeding-.
that she must be presumed to have acted as the
agent of and subject to the -control· of her· husband. We are of the opinion that she, having no
legal noti·ce, had no noti,ce at all, and as to any
interest, nominal or real, of hers, the proceedings
of the court and the sale under the dec.ree were
a nullity. There is no attempt to show that,
at the time the deed "\vas made to the .wife, the
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husband was in debt, and the deed in fraud of
-creditors; and if he vvere not, he might well procure a -conveyance to her for her separate use,
and the la\v will uphold it until fraud is shown."
As t~o the· necessity of joining the wife in the foreclosure action, the court stated:

1

''The most important and decisive question
remains to be considered. The bill expressly
sta:tes that, after the sale, the title to the prem~
tses sold vvas found to be in the name of Penna
Pressey, .vvho was made a. party to the original
suit. Was she rightfully joined~ If so, then service upon· her was a necessity to confer any po,ver
on the court to deal 'vith her interest in the controversy. If she were not a. necessary party to
the suit, and had no interest to bind, although
more a. party to the bill, the serviee might be
omitted. But it is stated that the legal title was
in his wife; nor does it ·change the result to say
: that her interest is merely nominal. ~She being
the legal owner ;of the estate, which by la'v she
might be, the legal title could be divested out of
her only· in two vvays : by her own act ·and by act
· of law; that is, the proceeding of. a court having
: competent jurisdiction of the subject of the suit.
-.She, being the legal.owner of the property, before
any pr.oceeding could affect her interests, nominal
or. rea.l, must have he en made a party to the h~ll,
have been duly served with pro.cess·, and thus
given the ·Opportunity, by legal forms, of showing
.her rig1J.ts, whatever: they were .. Not having been
served iri the foreelosure suit, the proceedings as
to her were a nullity."

In the case a.t bar .Mrs. Gigliotti did nothing affirmatively th~t would ~c:onstitute an estoppel on her part. The
most that .can be said is that knowing of the fore.closure
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proceeding she remained ~ilent as to her interest in the
property. The Ptessey ease and the ease of Barnk- of
[T-n:-ited Stales r. Lee, cited by the Ptessey case, sta.tes
the general rule to the effect that although the wife is
silent, her mere silenee does not estop her from later
djsclosing her interest in the property.
17 Am. Jur., Section 80 on the subject of dower does
not support the theory that t'he appellant is estopped at
this time to ·claim any interest in the property. The text
clearly states the general law to the effe-c.t that no estoppel may be predicted on the mere silence of a .widow or
a wife.
There is nothing in the rec.ord to indicate that Mrs.
Gigliotti attempted to de·ceive or defraud the resp,ondent
in any particular. The respondent knew of the marital
status betvveen Ro~s Gigliotti a~nd the appellant in this
action. He also knew that the appellant was residing
on the property at the time of his foreclosure suit. Mere
possession under the circumstances would put the reS'pondent on notice of any claims that Mrs. Gigliotti had
in or to the property. He made no inquiry as to her
rights in the premises and yet he had constructive notice
of them. It would be ano-malous indeed if under the cir.r~umstan•ces

the rule of estoppel would ap.ply. That such

a rule does not apply is clearly shown by the authorities
indica ted a.bove."
The a:ppellant · has three ·separate claims to·' the
property:
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· :First: The appellant is the head of. a family, contempla:ted by Title 28, Revised Statut.es of Utah, 1933,
dealing with homesteads. Her reply in the case indicates
the claim of homestead upon her part and which claim
can be raised at any time. The claim of homestead goes
to the right, title and interest of the husband, Ross Gigliotti; in the contra:ct of sale entered into with his parents
as .sellers and himself as purchaser on the 31st day of
August, 1931 a;nd which contra~ct was recorded the same
year and long prior to the foreclosure proceeding. The
Supren1e Court in the case of Albergo v. Gigliotti, et a!l.,
supra, held that this contract was a valid and subsisting
contract between the parties, with an over-abundance of
vitality-so much s-o that Ross Gigliotti was precluded
from claiming the property by reason of a tax deed,
which the court will recall was one o.f the issues raised
in the fore~closure suit.
,seeond: ·The a:ppeHant has an inchoate statutory
interest in the .property and in the equity represented
by the-.contract of sale above mentioned.
Third: 'The appellant is the fee simple owner of
the property by reason of the quit claim deed executed
on the 17th day of July, 1937 from her mother-in-law,
father-in-law and husband. This deed was introduced
in evidence· in the trial of this case by the defendant on
cross e~amination o.f the plaintiff and its authenticity
was .~ever attacked or questioned.

On

the l,ast two p·ropositions the following authorities are, we believe, in point :
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Wi-ltsie on .Mortgage .Foreclosure, Third
Edition, Vol. 1. Quoting Section ·, 155,
p. 2•28:

"It has become a settled rule of law, in all
states where the common-lavv doctrine of do,ver
remains unchanged, and in many states vvhere
statutes haYe preS'cribed a 'vife 's rights in the teal
estate of her husband, that the inchoate right of
dozcer of a. zuife in the la.n.ds of her husbi(J;nd is a
real and e.rist-ing interest, and as much entitled
to protection as the vested rights of a wido'v;
and that n-either earn) be i.ntpaired by avny judicial
procePding to zchich the wife or ttvidow is not
rnade a pa.rty. As such rights constitute an interest'
in real estate, it is plain that a ·wife or widow
must be made a party to a foreclosure suit where
she has signed the mortgage, released her rights
otherw·ise, or acqu.ired those rights subsequent to
the exe;c·u.tion .of the mortgage. The rig·ht of a
wife to be end otV"ed of an equity of redemptiovn
has long been put al rest. She is am absolu.tely
necessary pa1rty to a;n action in order t-o p~roduce
such a title as a purcJhaser at the -sale ~vill be compelled to accept. * * * In those states where
the statutes provide for homesteads for the heads
of families the wife of the mortgagor of la.nd occupied and claimed by him as a homestead is a
necessary party to the foreclosure of the m·ortga_ge and to an action of ejectment by the purchaser at the sale thereunder, although the mortgage is given for purchase money. And in those
cases where a married man has filed a de·claration
of homestead on his mortgaged premises, his wife
is a necessary party :defendant. in fore-clo·sure;
and if she is not made a party, the pu~c:haser at
the foreclosure sale is not entitled to a writ of
assistance against her hus·band. '' (Italics ours).
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Sloa,ne v.

Lu,ca~s,

et a.Z., 79 Pac. 949, ('Vash.)

''Subsequently to the execution of the n1ortgage, and prior to the bringing of the· foreclosure
suit, the mortgagors conveyed the mortgaged land
. to James F. Sloane, who, by· the terms of the con~
veyance, assumed. the payn1en t of the mortgage.
The said James F. Sloane \Vas· at the time the
husband of I~da H. ~Sloane, a:nd the two were
husband and wife when the foreclosure suit was
· brought. Ida H. iSl'oane · was not made a party
defendant in the foreclosure suit. De~c:ree of foreclosure was rendered, and the land was sold thereunder to one Henry C. Townsend, who \vas then
the holder of the mortgage. * * *
''The said foreclosure sale was void, within
the rule . dec1:ared by former decisions of this
·court, for failure to 111ake party defendant the
vvife who was a. mem;ber of the co1nmunity holding the legal ti tie to the land.''

N ortJluwestern Tru.st Co. v. Ry'arn,
132 N. W. 202, (Minn.)-Quoting from
p. 203:

'·'·The first conte:ntion of the plaintiff is \vithout merit. It is the e-stablished law of this state
that a :wife may redeem the lands of her husband
fr0:m a foreclosure sale. Such redemption is permitted for the proteetion of her rig4t, inchoate
thou~h it may be, tn the la:nd. A redemption by
·her in effect· annuls the sale, leaving the property
in the same condition as if· the mortgage never
: . had. heen made. On. principle this rule is no~t af. feeted by the fa{~t that the husband acquires the
. fee of land subject to a. .purchase- money mort.··· gage. · · In suich case t'he wife has her inchoate
'•'dower right in the land. Such right may he lost
: ;by foreclosure of the mortgage. · If a foreclosure
·saJe is ma.de, she ma.y preserve her right by redeeming from the sale.
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'• The \Yife not hn Ying been made a party to
the suit, her equity of redeinption is not limitc~d
or determined by the decree.''
J( ursheedt, ct al., v. Union· D'i1ne Savings

lnst., 23 N. E. 473, (Ne\Y York)__..Quoting- fron1 p. 474:
''The grantee, Sandford, in the conveyance
made by Clark, \Yas served, and so far as he was
concerned the failure to serve Clark had no importanc-e, ,and its ·only .conseque~nce has relation t~o
~Irs. Sandford, and the effect of the foreclosure
a·ction, the decree, and its execution, if executed,
upon her alleged inchoate right of dower in the
premises. Assuming, as we may for the purposes
of this review, that such right existed when the
foreclosure action was ~commenced, it was the subject of her protection by ·means of defense or any
other a.dequa~te remedy until lawfully barred. *
* * The right of dower is not de-rived from the
husband. It is a right .at ·c:ommon law, and arises
lby reason of the marriage and by operation of
law. It is a right which attaches on the land when
the seisin and the marriage relation are concurrent, and such is the effect of the statute. * * *
When it was essential, under an ·early statute of
this state, to determine the relation of the wife
to the grant made of la:nd to her husband, it was
held that the wife's inchoate right of dower vested at the moment of the grant to the husband;
and that she took such right constructively as
purchaser from the grantor. * * * And, inasmuch as Mrs. \S:andford did not derive her inchoate right of dower from her husband, .the fact
that he was a party defendant to the foreclosure
n·ction did not ope-rate to. bar or defeat her right
of redemption.''
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.42 C. J. ~ Section 1574, ·P· ·5.3-:
''The vlife of the grantee of an equity' of
redemption in lands subject to a ~mortgage is a
necessary party to an action. against the grantee
for fo-reclosure of the mortgage, hut the judgment
is no~. void f:or the failure to IIl.ake her a party.''
~

'

'

.

' ,~· ~'.

.·.

.

~

I, .

Ca.rlquist v. Co'ltharp,' :~·
. ·248 .PaG. 481, (Utah). Quoting at page
':' : 485:
0

· '''·Louise Jens-en, being the o\vner of the legal
title, ~~a.s entitled by reason of her interest in the
pren1ises to redeem from the f.oreclo~sure sale at
least that p.art of the premises to which she held
title .. Her right to redeem would not expire until
···.. she had had her day in court or until some judg., .. mea1t .or. decree had been entered terminating such
, . right, 9r at lea~t fixing a time when her right to
·:redeem :would termina,te, and that, as we under·' stand ,the··court's order, is its legal effect. * * *
,., Louise Jensen :by reason of the conveyance
to .her, had the· right to redeem froJU the foreQlosure sale. Her right of redemption was equal
i:ri time to the right of any other pe-rso-n entitled
to ·redeem, namely six months from the date of
.the foreclosu-re sale, if she was a party to the
pro·ee~diiJ.gs then pendin.g and had been served
;· with. process. The duration of her right, or the
· time in which she ·is entitled to redeem, could not
.be curtailed or shortened by any order the court
: . might at a subsequent date ma.iJre. ''
:on the question .of the . statute of limitations, the
U~ah

·'case of Boucofski v. Ja.cobson, 36 Utah 165, 104
Pa!c. 117, is conclusive on the point that one claiming
titl~ to :9r .an interest in or a lien on. realty :rn.a.y invoke
t:he; st~tute ·Of limitations as against a prior claim~nt
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'"hen the latter'~ claim ha ~ been barred by the statute
of lin1ita tions.
Quoting fro1n -:1-.:l (~. J., 1ll orfga{}es, Sect :on
1;)()7' p. 50:

"If the mortg·agor, after the execution of the
mortgage, Inakes a. ·c.onveya:nee of the mortgaged
property, and the conveyance is not reeorded before foreclosure proceedings are commenced, and
the mortgagee is not noti~fied of the grantee's
interest, by his being· in possession or otherwise,
such grantee need not be made a defendant, and
a judgment against the mortgagor is .conclusive
agains.t him. ' '
·
Under the authorities above mentioned the appellant
was a necessary party to the foreclosure suit and not
having been made a party defendant her right of redemption has neYer been terminated and as to her the foreclosure proceedings are void. It is earnestly contended that
this court should .and n1ust determine the equities, rights
and interests of the appellant in and to the prop·erty
des·cribed in the complaint as against the respondent,
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, a sale ha.d in proeeed~ngs in which the appellant was not made a party.
It is contended that appellant is now entitled, by reason
of the quit claim deed introduced in evidence by the respondent himse·lf on ·cross examination, a.nd by reason
of the expiration of the statute of limitations as well as
her inchoate and homes.tead rights to the decree .prayed
for.

By
of this

rc~a son
('.allRP

of the unusual turn of events at the trial
a:n extensive brief on some of the matters
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origi1~ally

relied upon by way of reply are unnecessary.
It will be reinem·bered that 'the respondent' introduced a
deed in. evidence dated prior to tlhe commencement of the
for~cl~·sure .suit ..~his deed wa~ from the t'vo elderly Gig:liotties .and Ross Gigli<?tti. to the appellant and rnvolved
the property in question.
:

',

,(

'

.·

.

'

· Having introduced the deed in evidence the respondent made no att~mpt to atta,ck its authenticity and, therefore, we have a situation where the appellant is, by the
respondent's own evide:nce, a ·purchaser of the property
for value before notice of the pendency of any action and
is in a position to inVtoke the statute of limitations, there
being .no privity of contract between she and her
grantors.
That a wife ·can raise the statute of limitations upon
a no:te which even she ha.s signed with her husband and
where it is not shoWn that her husband wa.s acting as her
age:nt in making payments is -clearly held in the ease of
Hallow:a.y v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P:ac. ('2d) 56·5 .
.So far as the homestead laws are concerned, the
matter is purely statutory coming under Title 38 of our
Revised Codes of Utah, 1933. It would be a matter of
supererogation to quote these various statutes, but the
cases of Panagopu.Zos v. Ma:rwning, 9·3 U.tah 198, 69 Pac.
(:2d) 614; Uta.h Builders Supply Com(pany v. Gardrner,
86 Utah 257, 42 Pac. (2d) 989, and Williams v. Peterson,
86 Utah 5·2~6, 46 P'ac. (2d) 674, all indicate the broad effe.ct give:n our statute hy the Supreme Court. The weakness of respondent's position is very clearly shown in
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his effort to discredit the n1arriage be.t,veen the appellant
and her husband and in the fact that the evidence is undisputed that he, the respondent, kne"~ tha:t the appellant
"~as residing on .the property at the time of his foreclosure suit and holding herself out as the vvife of Ross
Gigliotti and yet he failed to make her a party to the
same.
The problems involved are very clear and simple.
We submit that appellant should have judgment as
prayed for in her ·eomplaint and in her reply, bearing in
mind the amendment to the reply permitted by the c:ourt
which amendment pertained to the deed produced and
intr~oduced in evidence by the respondent himself.
Respectfully submitted,

W. GusTIN,
Attorney for Plaintiff
arnd Appella.nt.

HARLEY
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